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FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: THE CASE FOR RE-EXAMINING 
SECTION 76 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 
Public Prosecutor v Lew Syn Pau 
[2006] 4 SLR 210 
Wu Yang Construction Group v Zhejiang Jinyi Group Co, Ltd 
[2006] 4 SLR 451 
Section 76 of the Companies Act prohibits the giving by a 
company of financial assistance for the purpose of or in 
connection with the acquisition of its own shares. This penal 
provision is highly controversial in view of its breadth and 
uncertainty in its application. In the recent criminal 
prosecution of PP v Lew Syn Pau and in the recent civil 
litigation of Wu Yang Construction Group v Zhejiang Jinyi 
Group Co, Ltd, the Singapore High Court had to determine the 
scope of the prohibition under s 76 of the Companies Act. This 
case comment examines the two Singapore decisions and 
suggests that there appears to be a divergence in the views on 
the underlying rationale behind the prohibition. The article 
also seeks to evaluate the possible impact of these decisions on 
certain issues that often arise in mergers and acquisitions 
transactions in Singapore. 
WAN Wai Yee∗ 
LLB (Hons)(National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford); 
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), 
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law (New York State), 
Solicitor (England & Wales);  
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 Section 76 of the Companies Act,1 which contains the prohibition 
on a Singapore company giving financial assistance for the purpose of or 
in connection with the acquisition of its own shares, is one of the most 
controversial provisions in the Companies Act. The scope of the 
prohibition is often uncertain and this is compounded by the fact that 
 
 
 
∗  The author wishes to thank Mr Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara from Wong Partnership, 
Associate Professor Pearlie Koh and Assistant Professor Lee Pey Woan from 
Singapore Management University for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of 
this article. All errors which remain are attributable to the author alone. 
1  Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed. 
19 SAcLJ 80 Re-examining Section 76 of the Companies Act  
 
81
financial assistance issues often potentially arise in any corporate 
transaction involving an acquisition of shares of a Singapore company 
(including a reorganisation, refinancing, restructuring or structured 
finance transaction). The cases interpreting s 76 in Singapore and its 
statutory equivalent in overseas jurisdictions are often highly fact-specific 
and it is difficult to obtain guidance as to whether a particular assistance 
under consideration falls within the prohibition. Compliance with s 76 is 
taken very seriously as the contravention of s 76 would render the officers 
of the relevant company guilty of an offence,2 and in addition each 
transaction or contract that contravenes s 76 may be void or voidable 
under s 76A.3 
2 Reform proposals on s 76 had been considered by the Company 
Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (“CLRFC”)4 as 
recently as 2002. Despite acknowledging the criticism that the prohibition 
in s 76 is “fraught with uncertainty and amenable to reform”,5 the CLRFC 
declined to overhaul s 76 but instead recommended, inter alia, the 
amendment of the scope of the existing exceptions and the introduction 
of new exceptions, to s 76.6 These recommendations were implemented 
via the Companies (Amendment) Act 2005. The introduction of new 
 
 
 
2  A breach of s 76 carries with it serious consequences as the officers of the company 
that has provided unlawful financial assistance can be criminally liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding $20,000 and/or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
three years under s 76(5). Officers of the company may also be civilly liable for 
breach of s 76.  
3  A transaction or contract is void if it is one that falls within s 76A(1), that is, a 
contract or transaction by which a company acquires or purports to acquire its own 
shares or units of its own shares, or shares or units of shares in its holding company 
and a contract or transaction by which a company lends money on the security of its 
own shares or units of its own shares, or on the security of shares or units of shares 
in its holding company. In all other instances, a contract or transaction made or 
entered into in contravention of s 76, or a contract or transaction related to such 
contract or transaction, is voidable at the option of the company, under s 76A(2). 
4  The Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (“CLRFC”) was 
appointed by the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney-General’s Chambers, and the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) in December 1999. The terms of 
reference were “to undertake a comprehensive and coherent review of our company 
law and regulatory framework and recommend a modern company law and 
regulatory framework for Singapore which accords with global standards and which 
will promote a competitive economy”. The members of the CLRFC comprised 
mainly persons who are in the private sector and with wide ranging experience and 
expertise.  
5  See Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee, Report of the 
Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (October 2002) (“CLRFC 
Report”), ch 2, para 3.4.1. 
6  CLRFC Report, ibid at ch 2, para 3.4. The recommendations in relation to the 
financial assistance rules were introduced via the Companies (Amendment) Act 
2005. 
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exceptions only mitigates but does not eliminate the thorny issue of 
determining whether there has been financial assistance rendered which 
is prohibited under s 76 in the first place. This is particularly important in 
situations where it may be impractical to rely on the exceptions in view of 
the lead time that is required7 or the administrative burden that is 
involved.8  
3 The scope of the prohibition on the provision of financial 
assistance is considered in the two recent decisions of the High Court in 
PP v Lew Syn Pau9 (“Lew Syn Pau”) and Wu Yang Construction Group v 
Zhejiang Jinyi Group Co, Ltd10 (“Wu Yang Construction”). In Lew Syn Pau, 
Menon JC in the High Court considered the question of whether a 
Singapore parent company has provided indirect financial assistance, in 
contravention of s 76, where its foreign subsidiary has provided direct 
financial assistance for the acquisition of the shares of its parent 
company. The decision clarified a fundamental issue of when assistance 
rendered would be regarded as “financial” within the prohibition set out 
in s 76. In Wu Yang Construction, Andrew Phang Boon Leong J in the 
High Court addressed the issue of whether the assistance was for one of 
the proscribed purposes in s 76 and the relationship between ss 76(3) and 
76(4) was subject to careful examination. 
4 These two decisions are important in illustrating the judicial 
attitudes towards the scope of the prohibition on financial assistance. 
While both decisions emphasise the importance of taking a commercial 
view in determining whether a transaction falls within the prohibition, 
there appears to be a divergence of views on what should be the rationale 
underlying s 76. Lew Syn Pau affirms the traditional view that the 
prohibition on financial assistance is a rule relating to the capital 
maintenance of a company but in Wu Yang Construction, there appears to 
be a shift towards viewing the prohibition as rules supplementing 
directors’ fiduciary duties. This note discusses the two decisions and seeks 
to evaluate their possible impact on certain issues that often arise in 
mergers and acquisitions transactions, particularly the provision of 
 
 
 
7  Eg, a “whitewash” resolution under s 76(10) requires the approval of the 
shareholders by way of a special resolution and there is a minimum 21–day waiting 
period commencing from the date of the publication of the notice (setting out the 
terms of the resolution) during which, inter alia, shareholders and creditors may 
apply to the court opposing the giving of the financial assistance. 
8  Eg, the exception under s 76(9A) requires a notice to be sent to all the shareholders 
of the company within 10 business days of providing the financial assistance. 
9  [2006] 4 SLR 210. 
10  [2006] 4 SLR 451. 
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representations, warranties and indemnities by target companies and the 
payment of dividend at the conclusion of take-over transactions. 
II. The judgments in Lew Syn Pau and Wu Yang Construction 
A. Lew Syn Pau – the facts in summary and decision 
5 The facts in Lew Syn Pau were largely not disputed. The first 
accused, L, was a friend and business associate of the second accused, W. 
W was a director and the single largest shareholder of Broadway 
Industrial Group Ltd (“BIGL”), a Singapore company listed on Singapore 
Exchange. BIGL is the direct parent company of Compart Holdings (S) 
Pte Ltd (“Compart Holdings”), which is in turn a direct parent company 
of Compart Asia Pte Ltd (“Compart Singapore”). Both Compart 
Holdings and Compart Singapore are Singapore companies. Compart 
Singapore held all the shares of Compart Asia Pacific Limited (“Compart 
Mauritius”), a Mauritius company. W and L each held directorships of 
Compart Holdings, Compart Singapore and Compart Mauritius. L was 
not a director of BIGL. 
6 BIGL had entered into a share placement agreement with Silver 
Touch Holding Pte Ltd (“Silver Touch”) pursuant to which Silver Touch 
would subscribe for 33 million new ordinary shares of BIGL in two 
tranches. Upon the completion of the share placement, Silver Touch and 
W would hold 22% and 14.63% of BIGL respectively and Silver Touch 
would replace W as the single largest shareholder of BIGL. Prior to the 
scheduled date of completion of the placement, it appeared that Silver 
Touch was unable to complete the placement due to lack of funds. W was 
concerned because if the placement did not take place, there were adverse 
financial consequences to BIGL. In order to put Silver Touch in funds, it 
was agreed that Compart Mauritius (which had the funds) would give a 
temporary loan to L who would in turn loan the amount (and at an 
interest rate of 1% per month) to T, who controlled Silver Touch. Silver 
Touch would then complete the placement in respect of the first tranche. 
Under Mauritius law, there was no prohibition against a Mauritius 
company (such as Compart Mauritius) extending a loan to its director so 
long as the board of directors authorised such a loan. It was not disputed 
that W and L knew that the moneys belonging to Compart Mauritius 
were used to enable Silver Touch to acquire the shares in BIGL. 
7 W and L were each charged under s 76(1)(a)(i)(A) of the 
Companies Act; W was charged with knowingly and wilfully authorising 
BIGL to indirectly give financial assistance to T by authorising a loan 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2007) 
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from Compart Mauritius to L for the latter to use the money as a loan to 
T, for the purpose of enabling Silver Touch to acquire the shares of BIGL. 
L was charged with abetting, by intentionally aiding, W to knowingly and 
wilfully authorising BIGL to indirectly give financial assistance to T. The 
crucial issue in the case was whether any financial assistance was provided 
to T by BIGL and whether such assistance was prohibited under s 76. The 
Prosecution had conceded that the funds advanced to L belonged to 
Compart Mauritius (and did not originate from BIGL). Instead, the 
Prosecution had argued that the funds used to provide financial 
assistance to T were funds belonging to the “BIGL group”. 
8 At the end of the Prosecution’s case, counsel for W and L 
submitted that there was no case to answer on the basis that with the facts 
presented by the Prosecution, W and L had not committed the offences as 
charged. The court held that the Prosecution failed to make out the case 
that there was financial assistance given by BIGL in contravention of 
s 76(1)(a)(i)(A) and W and L were acquitted. The Prosecution has not 
appealed against the decision.11 
(1) Financial assistance 
9 Menon JC in Lew Syn Pau held that the scheme of the Companies 
Act was that assistance by a company in order to facilitate the acquisition 
of its shares was not prohibited generally; what was prohibited was the 
giving of assistance that was “financial” in nature. For assistance to be 
“financial” in nature, there must have been diminution or depletion of 
the company’s assets; actual depletion was not required so long as “the 
assets have been placed at risk and there is a potential for future depletion 
to take place by virtue of an undertaking or obligation entered into by the 
company at the time of and in connection with the acquisition of its 
shares.”12 The test is viewed from the company’s perspective and not from 
the perspective of the intending purchaser.  
10 The court reached the conclusion based on the following: (a) the 
Australian cases, starting from Burton v Palmer,13 have held that a 
company had provided financial assistance for an acquisition only if its 
assets were either being used or were at risk of being depleted in 
connection with that acquisition and this was being done otherwise than 
in the ordinary course of business, (b) the legislative purpose of s 76 was 
 
 
 
11  “No appeal against acquittal of Lew Syn Pau”, Business Times (31 August 2006).  
12  Supra, n 9 at [99]. 
13  [1980] 2 NSWLR 878. 
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to preserve the company’s capital and to prevent the use of its assets in 
connection with an intended acquisition of its shares, and (c) the test 
relating to the depletion of assets was applied in the Malaysian High 
Court decision in Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See 
Keat14 and the South African Supreme Court decision in Lipschitz No v 
UDC Bank.15  
11 Based on the test relating to the depletion of assets set out above, 
the court held that BIGL did not provide any financial assistance in 
respect of the acquisition of shares, whether directly or indirectly. At no 
time was BIGL’s assets being used or put at risk of actual depletion. What 
is significant is that the court drew a distinction between direct and 
indirect financial assistance. Direct assistance refers to putting the 
company’s assets directly in the hands of the intended purchaser of the 
company’s shares. Indirect financial assistance refers to the relevant 
company making its assets available to the intended purchaser of the 
company’s shares by routing such assets through another vehicle, such as 
the foreign subsidiary of such company. As the Prosecution’s case was that 
the funds for subscription of the shares of BIGL came from Compart 
Mauritius (and not BIGL) and BIGL’s assets were not put at risk of 
depletion, there was no financial assistance by BIGL.  
(2) Lifting of the corporate veil 
12 The Prosecution’s alternative submission was that the corporate 
veil between BIGL and Compart Mauritius should be lifted and the acts 
of Compart Mauritius should be treated as the acts of its holding 
company. On this argument, the acts of Compart Mauritius which 
provided financial assistance to Silver Touch in connection with the 
shares of BIGL were to be regarded as the acts of BIGL. The court rejected 
the Prosecution’s argument and held that BIGL and Compart Mauritius 
were separate legal entities; the acts of one company would not generally 
be regarded as the acts of the other under the rule in Salomon v 
Salomon.16 The doctrine of separate legal personality was not displaced 
merely because the companies were organised as a single economic unit 
or that BIGL controlled Compart Mauritius.  
 
 
 
14  [1999] 5 MLJ 421 (M’sia). 
15  [1979] 1 SA 789. 
16  [1897] AC 22. 
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B. Wu Yang Construction – the facts in summary and decision 
13 Wu Yang Construction arose from the sale and purchase 
agreement in respect of the shares of VGO Corporation Ltd (“VGO”). 
Unlike Lew Syn Pau, Wu Yang Construction was not a criminal 
prosecution but the issues of financial assistance were raised in a 
commercial dispute. Simplifying the facts somewhat, VGO and Kingsea 
Ltd (“Kingsea”) entered into an agreement (“Agreement”) pursuant to 
which VGO would purchase all the shares of Spring Wave Ltd (Spring 
Wave” together with certain loans advanced by Kingsea to Spring Wave 
(collectively, the “relevant assets”) for an aggregate consideration of 
RMB 55m, based on the net asset value (“NAV”) of Spring Wave and its 
subsidiaries (“Spring Wave group”). Subsequently the purchase 
consideration was adjusted to RMB 50.596m. The purchase consideration 
was to be satisfied by the issuance of new shares in VGO. Completion of 
the Agreement took place and the new VGO shares were issued in favour 
of, inter alia, Kingsea. Out of these new VGO shares issued in favour of 
Kingsea, a large proportion of such new VGO shares (“escrow shares”) 
was retained by VGO with a power of sale reserved to the directors of 
VGO in the event of a breach by Kingsea of certain warranties. These 
escrow shares continued to be registered in the name of Kingsea. Kingsea 
defaulted on the warranties and VGO exercised its power of sale and the 
escrow shares were sold to M. In the meantime, the plaintiff entered into 
certain agreements with the second defendant (who was the owner and 
controller of Kingsea) pursuant to which the second defendant, inter alia, 
agreed to pledge the VGO shares (which included the escrow shares) that 
were registered in Kingsea’s name to the plaintiff. At the hearing, the issue 
was one of priority of the transactions vis-a-vis the escrow shares and it 
was found that VGO and M were clearly entitled to succeed. Counsel for 
the plaintiff argued, however, inter alia, that there was financial assistance 
by VGO in aiding the purchase of its shares on the ground of the 
difference in amount between the actual and the agreed NAV of Spring 
Wave group and such difference resulted in new VGO shares being 
issued.17  
 
 
 
17  It was not clear how the argument on financial assistance would have helped the 
plaintiff because even if the Agreement amounted to financial assistance, it would 
have been rendered voidable under s 76A and it would have been for the company 
(VGO) to determine whether the Agreement should be avoided. If the Agreement 
was not in fact avoided, it was not clear how it would affect the priority of security 
interests that VGO had. 
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14 The High Court had no hesitation in rejecting the plaintiff ’s 
argument that the Agreement contravened s 76 on the following grounds: 
(a) there was no financial assistance because the issuance of new shares as 
purchase consideration for the relevant assets did not deplete the capital 
of VGO; (b) VGO issued new shares in order to pay for the relevant assets, 
which was a very different proposition from assisting the acquiror to 
purchase its shares; (c) the Agreement was a genuine agreement entered 
into bona fide by VGO and the court would not inquire into the quantum 
of consideration of the Agreement; (d) the Agreement was entered into 
bona fide in the commercial interest of the company and “section 76 was 
never intended to ‘capture’ transactions which were entered into bona fide 
in the commercial interests of the company itself (as opposed to 
providing, in substance if not form, financial assistance for the purchase 
of the company’s own shares)”;18 and (e) the phrase “in connection with” 
in s 76(1)(a) did not broaden the scope of the prohibition under s 76 and 
such phrase should be read restrictively so as to be consistent with the 
phrase “for the purpose of” in the same provision.  
15 The court observed that the exception in s 76(8)(c), that is, the 
discharge by a company of its liability that was incurred in good faith as a 
result of a transaction entered into on ordinary commercial terms, could 
possibly apply on the facts. This may indicate that the scope of s 76(8)(c) 
is more liberal than what is previously assumed to be the position. Prior 
to Wu Yang Construction, cautious advisers would have argued that the 
exception did not apply where the liability in question arose from the 
same transaction which amounted to the giving of financial assistance.19  
III. Financial assistance and corporate acquisitions  
A. Elements of financial assistance 
16 An analysis of whether a transaction entered into by the company 
contravenes s 76 necessarily involves a consideration of the following 
three issues: (a) whether there is an acquisition or proposed acquisition 
of shares of a company or units of shares in the holding company of the 
 
 
 
18  Supra, n 10, at [35]. 
19  Fitzsimmons v R (1997) 23 ACSR 355 (SC, WA). An example where the exception 
could apply is the situation where the shares are acquired as a result of the 
compromise of a debt due by the company which was incurred in good faith. See 
Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 10 ACSR 297 (SC, 
WA) at 345. 
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company; (b) whether the company has, directly or indirectly, rendered 
any assistance that was “financial” in nature; and (c) whether the 
assistance is for one of the proscribed purposes set out in s 76, that is, 
whether it is “for the purpose of” or “in connection with” the acquisition 
by any person, whether before or at the same time as the giving of 
financial assistance, of shares or units of shares in the company.  
B. Legislative purpose behind section 76 
17 The statutory predecessor of s 76 was based on s 54 the UK 
Companies Act 1948. By way of background, in 1926, the Report of the 
Company Law Amendment Committee chaired by Lord Greene (“Greene 
Committee”)20 had considered the widespread practice that existed in 
1920s where syndicates would agree to purchase a controlling stake in a 
company, the purchase money was provided by the bank, the syndicate’s 
nominees were appointed to the board and proceeded to lend to the 
syndicate, out of the company’s funds, the money required to pay off the 
loan from the bank.21 Such a practice offended the rule on capital 
maintenance, as derived from Trevor v Whitworth,22 which prohibited a 
limited company from returning capital to its shareholders other than in 
respect of the distribution of profits, reduction of capital or distribution 
of surplus assets on a winding up, as these former shareholders were 
cashed out at the expense of the creditors. The recommendations of the 
Greene Committee resulted in the enactment of s 45 of the Companies 
Act 1929, which was subsequently followed by s 54 of the Companies Act 
1948.23  
18 In Singapore, when the Companies Act24 was enacted in 1967, the 
prohibition on financial assistance contained therein was based on s 54 of 
the UK Companies Act 1948. Since 1967, the provision has been amended 
several times.25 The first significant amendment occurred in 1987 when 
 
 
 
20  Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee, Cmd 2657 (1926), chaired by 
Lord Greene. 
21  Ibid at para 30. 
22  (1887) 12 App Cas 409. 
23  The imperfections in the drafting of s 54 of the UK Companies Act 1948 were 
criticised in the Report of the Company Law Committee chaired by Lord Jenkins. See 
Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd 1749 (1962). For a historical 
discussion of the prohibition on financial assistance in the UK, see C Roberts, 
Financial Assistance for the Acquisition of Shares (Oxford University Press, 2005), c 2 
at 7–17. 
24  Act 42 of 1967. 
25  Prior to 1987, the legislation amending the provision included the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 1974 and the Companies (Amendment) Act 1984. 
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s 76 was repealed and re-enacted by the Companies (Amendment) Act 
1987. The amended s 76 (as it then was) was based on s 129 of the 
Australian Companies Act 1981. The changes included having a 
controlling prohibition on financial assistance that was more complex 
than that which existed previously and such prohibition was also 
supplemented by a more extensive list of exempted transactions and an 
exception which authorised the provision of financial assistance where 
the “white-washing” procedure was carried out. Sections 76(3) and 76(4) 
were inserted to define the circumstances in which the company was 
taken to have provided financial assistance “for the purpose of” and “in 
connection with” the acquisition. As mentioned above, s 76 was 
subsequently amended again via the Companies (Amendment) Act 2005.  
19 In Lew Syn Pau, the court affirmed the traditional view that the 
objective of s 76 was one of capital maintenance and the protection of 
creditors.26 However, it is submitted that the rule in s 76, as it currently 
stands, is wider than that required for capital maintenance or for creditor 
protection. First, the basic prohibition in s 76 applies to any assistance 
that depletes the assets of the company or places the assets at risk, 
regardless of whether the company has profits from which it can declare 
dividends. Dividends which are paid in circumstances other than in the 
ordinary course of commercial dealing may fall within the prohibition.27 
Second, s 76 prohibits loans which do not necessarily deplete the assets at 
all. Loans may also not place the assets at risk if the debtor is objectively 
credit-worthy and no provision against the likelihood of default has been 
made. Similarly, the granting of a security does not diminish the value of 
the company’s assets and may not place the value of such assets at risk in 
circumstances where it is unlikely that the security will be enforced. 
20 In Wu Yang Construction, the court held that a useful and 
practical approach was to inquire into the substance of the transaction 
pursuant to which the shares of the company changed hands. If the 
substance of the transaction was to enable the company to furnish, 
whether directly or indirectly, financial assistance for the purchase of its 
shares, then s 76 would have been clearly contravened.28 In determining 
the substance of the transaction, the court drew a distinction between a 
transaction that was entered into bona fide in the commercial interests of 
 
 
 
26  Supra, n 9 at [126]. 
27  The exception on payment of dividends under s 76(8)(a) does not apply if the special 
dividend is not paid in the ordinary course of commercial dealing: Milburn v Pivot 
Ltd (1997) 149 ALR 439 at 469.  
28  Supra, n 10, at [53]. 
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the company and a transaction that amounted to the provision of 
financial assistance. The court held that s 76 was “never intended to 
‘capture’ transactions by a company which were entered into bona fide in 
the commercial interests of the company itself (as opposed to providing, 
in substance if not form, financial assistance for the purchase of the 
company’s own shares)”.29 The mischief that was sought to be avoided in 
relation to s 76(1)(a) was held not to include transactions, the “sole or 
primary purpose of which is to give effect to the bona fide commercial 
interests of the company other than in the giving of financial assistance in 
order to assist in the purchase of the company’s shares”. 30 
21 This expression, “bona fide commercial interests of the company”, 
is similar to the common law test in relation to the validity of the conduct 
of directors.31 In drawing a distinction between a transaction which is 
entered into bona fide in the commercial interests of the company and a 
transaction whose sole or primary purpose amounts to financial 
assistance, it appears that the court has viewed the prohibition as a rule 
supplementing directors’ fiduciary duties, particularly their duties to act 
bona fide and in the commercial interests of the company. In particular, 
the court emphasised that the commercial realities of the transaction 
should be given effect to and s 76 was not intended to impede genuine 
commercial transactions.32 On this view, the use of the resources of a 
company to financially assist a purchaser solely or primarily to make the 
acquisition of shares will be an instance that is not a proper exercise of 
directors’ duties. Hence, it appears that there is a shift away from the view 
that the prohibition is a rule on maintenance of capital. The test of 
whether a transaction is bona fide in the commercial interests of the 
company was also imposed in the earlier Court of Appeal decision in 
Intraco v Multi-Pak Singapore33 (“Intraco”). In that case, it was held that 
the transactions in question were entered into bona fide in the 
commercial interest of the company and were not prohibited under s 76 
(as it then was).34  
 
 
 
29  Supra, n 10, at [35]. 
30  Supra, n 10, at [71]. 
31  Eg, Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 Ch 304 at 308; Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra 
Estates plc [1994] 1 BCLC 363 at 379. 
32  Supra, n 10, at [28], [35], [50] and [53]. The commercial realities of the transaction 
approach were discussed in Chaston v SWP Group plc, infra, n 35 and in 
MT Realisations Ltd (in liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 117. 
33  [1995] 1 SLR 313. 
34  Id, at 323. 
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22 However, it is respectfully submitted that the distinction drawn 
between a bona fide transaction in the commercial interests of the 
company and a transaction which is for the primary purpose of providing 
financial assistance is not always so clear-cut. In cases not involving sham 
transactions, it is not inconceivable that the directors may bona fide 
believe that the relevant transaction in question is in the commercial 
interest of the company but one of the purposes of such a transaction is 
to financially assist in the company’s own shares. In such a case, how 
should one determine what is the primary or substantial purpose of the 
acquisition? An example illustrating the point can be found in the context 
of Chaston v SWP Group plc.35 In that case, the issue was whether the 
payment of certain invoices to a firm of accountants by a subsidiary of a 
target company was regarded as unlawful financial assistance within s 151 
of the UK Companies Act 1985 (which contains the prohibition on 
financial assistance); these invoices were incurred in relation to the 
preparation of information used by the acquiror for the purposes of its 
own due diligence in order to conclude its negotiations in the purchase of 
the target company. The trial judge, at first instance, found that the 
liability to the accountants was incurred bona fide in what the directors 
believed in good faith was in the best interest of such subsidiary; the 
advancement of negotiations and co-operation with the acquiror were 
regarded as being beneficial to the target company and its subsidiaries. 
The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that such payment of 
fees by the subsidiary was financial in nature and was given for the 
purpose of facilitating the purchase of the target company. Arden LJ in 
Chaston v SWP Group plc, in response to the trial judge’s finding that the 
directors acted bona fide in the best interests of the subsidiary, held that 
due performance of fiduciary duties is not of itself enough to avoid a 
breach of s 151 of the UK Companies Act 1985 and “if it were, financial 
assistance by way of a loan by a target to a bidder on commercial terms 
might be outside s 151. That result would drive a coach and horses 
through these provisions”.36 Chaston v SWP is an example of a case where 
the directors believed that the payment of the fees was for the benefit of 
the company but s 151 was held to have been contravened because one of 
the purposes of the payment of such fees was to facilitate the acquisition 
of shares. If the facts arise under the Companies Act, and the directors 
have a bona fide belief that they are acting in the interests of the company 
by authorising the payment of fees, it is not clear after Wu Yang 
Construction on which side of the line between acting in the commercial 
 
 
 
35  [2002] EWCA Civ 1999; [2003] 1 BCLC 675. 
36  Ibid, [2002] EWCA Civ 1999 at [46]. 
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interests of the company (which seems to be permissible) and acting with 
the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of the shares (which is not 
permissible) their conduct falls. Arguably, such fees should be prohibited 
(in the absence of an exception) because the substantial purpose for the 
payment of such fees is to facilitate the acquisition of the company’s 
shares. 
23 One further point to note is that even though the phrase “the 
commercial interests of the company” and its variants are used in relation 
to directors’ duties and in the exceptions to financial assistance under 
ss 76(9A)(c)(ii) and 76(9B)(a)(ii),37 they have never been 
comprehensively defined. If the rule is seen as one of capital maintenance, 
the focus is whether the transaction results in a transfer of capital from 
the company to its shareholders (in their capacity as shareholders), 
thereby prejudicing or potentially prejudicing the interests of the 
creditors of the company. However if the basis of the rule is one of 
directors’ duties, the relevant interests that should arguably be taken into 
account would be the interests of the company and its stakeholders 
(including the employees, creditors and shareholders).38 In the context of 
the “white-wash” resolution approving the grant of financial assistance 
under s 76(10), regard is being made to the interests of creditors and 
members as the directors must take into account whether the financial 
assistance prejudices materially the interests of the creditors or members 
of the company. 
C. Assistance must be financial 
24 In Lew Syn Pau, the court had to consider whether there was 
provision of assistance that was “financial” in nature by BIGL and held 
that there must be an actual depletion, or a risk of depletion, of the 
relevant company’s assets.39 The court held that there was no financial 
assistance if the assets of the relevant company were not depleted or put 
at risk of depletion.  
25 There are two difficulties with the test formulated in relation to 
the test of depletion of assets or risk of depletion of assets. First, if it is 
 
 
 
37  Sections 76(9A)(c)(ii) and 76(9B)(a)(ii) refer to the “best interests of the company”. 
38  See Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc [1994] 1 BCLC 363 at 379 where the 
Court of Appeal held that the “duties owed by the directors are to the company and 
the company is more than just the sum total of its members”; see also Brady v Brady 
[1989] AC 755 at 778.  
39  Supra, n 9, at [189].  
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accepted that the Singapore parent company may have assisted in the 
acquisition of its shares by procuring that the foreign subsidiary put an 
intended purchaser in funds in order to acquire such shares, it could be 
argued that there was in fact a risk of depletion of the assets of the 
Singapore parent company. The reason was that there was a risk that the 
overall NAV of the Singapore parent company (as shown on the balance 
sheet of the Singapore parent company) would be reduced. Given that 
BIGL controlled Compart Mauritius, the financial statements of Compart 
Mauritius were consolidated into the BIGL group.40 Shareholders and 
creditors of BIGL would surely assess the performance of BIGL by the 
accounts of the BIGL group on a consolidated basis. If the intended 
purchaser was not credit-worthy and the loan to the intended purchaser 
was not in fact repaid, such a loan would have been written off. It should 
follow that the NAV of BIGL would be reduced by an impairment of its 
investment in Compart Mauritius if the loan was not recoverable. 
Arguably, such reduction in the NAV would amount to a depletion of the 
assets of BIGL. 
26 Second, the court held that the giving of financial assistance by a 
subsidiary did not ipso facto also constitute the giving of such assistance 
by the parent company, relying on Arab Bank v Mercantile Holdings Ltd41 
where Millet J held that the prohibition was directed at the assisting 
company and not at its parent company. The court rejected the 
Prosecution’s arguments that the acts of W should be attributed to the 
acts of BIGL as the Prosecution’s case was that W was acting as a director 
of Compart Mauritius in authorising the loan from Compart Mauritius 
and it was Compart Mauritius that had authorised the loan. It is 
suggested that further consideration could have been given to the issue as 
to whether the acts of W in procuring the transfer of the funds of BIGL’s 
subsidiary, could be construed as the acts of BIGL. W exercised 
substantial influence and was a dominant figure on the board of Compart 
Mauritius42 and as the single largest shareholder and executive chairman 
(and director) of BIGL, he could have exercised significant influence over 
BIGL. The view that only the acts of the board of directors can be 
attributed to the company has been rejected in Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia v Securities Commission43 and the issue as to whether 
the act of an individual can be attributed to the company is one of 
 
 
 
40  Supra, n 9, at [13]. 
41  [1994] Ch 71. 
42  Supra, n 9, at [41(g)]. 
43  [1995] 2 AC 500. See also El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685. 
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construction in each case of the particular rule in question. It could be 
argued that in the context of s 76, the acts and knowledge of W, the single 
largest shareholder and executive chairman of BIGL, could be attributed 
to BIGL. On this argument, W’s actions, by procuring that Compart 
Mauritius put the intended purchaser in funds for the acquisition of 
shares of BIGL, could be attributed to BIGL’s acts. Such an inquiry is not 
the same as lifting the corporate veil nor is it an inquiry into whether 
there can be recourse to the shareholders of a limited liability company 
decided under Salomon v Salomon; it is not proposed that the Singapore 
parent company be made liable for the debts of its foreign subsidiary. The 
issue is whether the Singapore parent company has provided financial 
assistance in breach of the prohibition, which is a criminal offence.  
D. Financial assistance for the purpose of, or in connection with, 
the acquisition 
27 Section 76 requires that the financial assistance must be “for the 
purpose of” or “in connection with” the acquisition. As set out above, 
ss 76(3) and (4), which purport to define these expressions, were included 
as a result of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1987. On a literal reading 
of ss 76(3) and (4), it would appear that “in connection with” is broader 
than “for the purpose of” and even where the company knows that the 
transaction would financially assist the acquisition of the shares but it is 
not the main purpose for such acquisition, it would not fall within s 76(3) 
but would fall within s 76(4). Prior to the Companies (Amendment) Act 
1987 coming into force, “for the purpose of” and “in connection with” 
were not defined. The Court of Appeal in Intraco did not consider 
whether there was a difference between the two expressions but held there 
was no financial assistance in breach of s 76 when looking at the 
transactions in their proper commercial context; they were not entered 
into “solely or mainly” for the purpose of enabling the acquisitions of the 
shares at no costs to themselves44 but were transactions entered into bona 
fide in the commercial interests of the company. 
28 The impact of ss 76(3) and 76(4) on the prohibition on financial 
assistance was not considered in Intraco simply because the relevant 
transactions that were sought to be impugned in that case took place in 
1984, and were decided on the basis of s 76 of the Companies Act that 
was in force prior to the commencement of the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 1987, which was in pari materia with s 54 of the UK 
 
 
 
44  Supra, n 33 at 324. 
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Companies Act 1948.45 This issue was finally considered in Wu Yang 
Construction. The court was of the view that while ss 76(3) and (4) are 
not exhaustive, the phrase “in connection with” in s 76(1) should be read 
narrowly so as to be consistent with the phrase “for the purpose of”, even 
though such an interpretation would render the phrase “in connection 
with” otiose. Such a construction was regarded as being consistent with 
taking a commercially practical approach.  
29 In reaching the conclusion, the court relied on the fact that 
s 76(4) refers, as an illustration of the phrase “in connection with”, to 
situations where the company was aware that its acts of financial 
assistance would assist the acquisition of its shares and this excluded a 
situation involving bona fide commercial transaction and where those 
acting for the company never even applied their minds to the potential 
effects that the transaction could have of financially assisting an 
acquisition of its shares.46 The result must have come as a surprise to 
many. Prior to the decision, one would have thought that ss 76(3) and 
76(4) should not be read in exactly the same way or one of the two sub-ss 
would be redundant. It also does not appear that for the assistance to be 
made in connection with the acquisition, it is essential for the company to 
be aware as envisaged by s 76(4). The Australian case law interpreting the 
Australian equivalent of the provision has held that it does not provide 
exhaustively the circumstances in which financial assistance is given in 
connection with an acquisition.47  
30 The result of the narrow interpretation of the phrase “in 
connection with” in s 76(1) may now mean that the focus of any inquiry 
will be on the objective of the company in providing the assistance. One 
consequence is that it may now be possible to argue that an inducement 
 
 
 
45  In Intraco, the Court of Appeal had to interpret s 76(1), as it then was, which 
provided that:  
(1) Except as is otherwise expressly provided by this Act, no company 
shall give, whether directly or indirectly and whether by means of a loan 
guarantee or the provision of security or otherwise, any financial assistance for 
the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or subscription made or to be 
made by any person of or for any shares in the company or, where the company 
is a subsidiary, in its holding company or in any way purchase, deal in or lend 
money on its own shares. 
The expressions “for the purpose of” and “in connection with” were not defined. 
The Companies (Amendment) Act 1987 provided expressly that transactions entered 
into before the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1987 would be 
grandfathered. See s 76(17) of the Companies Act. 
46  Supra, n 10, at [70]. 
47  Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1987) 16 NSWLR 212 at 248. 
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and incentive given by a company for the counter-party to enter into a 
transaction involving the acquisition of the company’s shares is not 
financial assistance given for the purpose of an acquisition; this 
distinction between inducements and incentives on the one hand and 
financial assistance on the other was drawn in British & Commonwealth v 
Barclays Bank plc48 (“British & Commonwealth”).  
E. Corporate acquisitions  
(1) The giving of representations, warranties and indemnities in 
corporate acquisitions 
31 In a merger or take-over transaction involving the acquisition of 
the shares, the target company may agree to make certain representations 
and warranties (to the acquiror) in a recommended offer. Subject to the 
agreement between the parties, the representations and warranties could 
relate to a state of affairs or conduct of the target company that exists on 
the date of agreement and up to the date when the acquisition is 
completed. Indemnities may also be requested to be given by the target 
company to hold harmless against losses by the acquiror in connection 
with the breach of the representations and warranties.  
32 Prior to Lew Syn Pau and Wu Yang Construction, notwithstanding 
the fact that it is not unusual for Singapore publicly listed target 
companies to give representations, warranties and indemnities to the 
acquiror in a merger or recommended offer, there is some doubt on 
whether such a practice contravened s 76. An argument could be made 
that if any of such representations and warranties is breached, the target 
company is liable to a claim in damages. Hence, according to this view, 
the provision of representations, warranties and covenants financially 
assists in the acquisition of the relevant shares. The provision of such 
representations and warranties is usually given to facilitate the acquisition 
of the shares of the Singapore company by the acquiror, which would 
satisfy the purpose requirement of such assistance. Certainly, prior to the 
amendment to s 76 creating an exception for a company giving 
representations, warranties and indemnities in relation to an initial public 
offering,49 it was recognised that such a company in an initial public 
 
 
 
48  [1996] 1 WLR 1. Cf Robert Chaston v SWP Group. 
49  Section 76(8)(ga), introduced by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2005, provided 
that it was an exception to the prohibition in respect of the provision of 
representations, warranties or indemnities in good faith and in the ordinary course 
of commercial dealing but only in relation to an offer to the public or an invitation 
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offering that involves vendor shares may be prohibited from giving 
representations, warranties and/or indemnities to investors (including 
underwriters) on the ground of financial assistance.50 Such 
representations, warranties or indemnities are given mainly for the 
benefit of the investors in the initial public offering, rather than that of 
the company.  
33 In Lew Syn Pau, Menon JC, citing Mahoney JA’s judgment in 
Burton v Palmer,51 held that to constitute assistance that is “financial” in 
nature, there must have been provision of a representation, warranty, 
indemnity with the “intention that the company will be called upon to 
pay damages and to provide funds in connection with the transfer of its 
shares”,52 and the mere fact that the company has undertaken an 
obligation, absolute or contingent, in connection with the proposal for 
the transfer of its shares does not amount to financial assistance. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that if the target company provides the 
representations and warranties believing that such representations are 
true and that the warranties will be complied with, the provision of such 
representations or warranties should not amount to assistance that is 
“financial” in nature. Alternatively, based on Intraco and Wu Yang 
Construction, it could be argued the commercial reality is that the 
provision of representations, warranties and indemnities is not given for 
the purpose of assisting the intended purchaser to acquire the shares but 
to reassure such intended purchaser, and any assistance that is rendered is 
only incidental. In this regard, British & Commonwealth is instructive. In 
that case, British & Commonwealth (“B&C”) had given certain covenants 
as to B&C’s ongoing financial position inter alia to a company Caledonia, 
which had subscribed for preference shares in B&C, and to a company 
called Tindalk which had entered into an option agreement pursuant to 
which it would be required to purchase the preference shares from 
Caledonia. The covenants were breached and Tindalk sued B&C for the 
breach. B&C argued that the option constituted unlawful financial 
assistance. The Court of Appeal held that the purpose of the covenants in 
the option was to reassure Caledonia (as an investor) and were bona fide 
covenants the performance of which did not involve the giving of any 
“financial assistance”. This aspect of the decision in British & 
Commonwealth was affirmed in Robert Chaston v SWP Group plc.  
 
 
 
to the public to subscribe for or purchase shares or units of shares in that company. 
It would not apply to a corporate acquisition. 
50  CLRFC Report, ch 2 para 3.4.7. 
51  Supra, n 9, at [168]. 
52  Supra, n 13, at 890. 
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34 Taking into account Lew Syn Pau, Wu Yang Construction and 
British & Commonwealth, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
representations, warranties and indemnities given by a target company in 
a transaction involving the sale of its shares to an acquiror would not 
constitute prohibited financial assistance under s 76.  
(2) Payment of dividends 
35 One frequent problem that arises is whether it is financial 
assistance by a target company to pay a special cash dividend, which is 
over and above the dividend that is customarily paid to shareholders, 
upon a change of control of such target company. The exception in 
s 76(8)(a) is not applicable as the special cash dividend cannot be 
regarded as being paid in the ordinary course of commercial dealing. The 
payment of the special cash dividend clearly amounts to assistance that is 
“financial” in nature. Prior to Wu Yang Construction, it could be argued 
that such payment breaches s 76 as the dividend may be used by the 
shareholders to repay their acquisition financing and there is a close 
enough relationship between the giving of assistance and the acquisition 
of shares in order for the assistance to be given “in connection with” the 
acquisition. In Singapore, there has been at least one instance where the 
publicly listed target company undertakes the “white-washing” procedure 
under s 76(10) in order to pay such cash dividend.53 
36 It is submitted that it is certainly arguable, in light of Wu Yang 
Construction, as to whether the cautious view was justified. It could be 
argued that where the directors of the company have properly determined 
that the payment of a special dividend is bona fide and is in the 
commercial interest of the company (that is, the general body of its 
shareholders), such payment should not amount to financial assistance.54  
37 However, if the purpose behind the prohibition is the 
maintenance of capital, the payment of the special dividend is not very 
different from the original justification for the prohibition, which is to 
prevent the target company’s assets from being used by the controlling 
shareholders after the conclusion of a take-over to repay their acquisition 
 
 
 
53  NatSteel Ltd, Circular to Shareholders, 4 July 2003, para 3.3. 
54  Directors are not expected to act only on the basis of the economic advantage of the 
company as a separate legal entity and ignore the interests of the shareholders. See, 
for example, L C B Gower, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, (Steven & 
Sons, 4th Ed, 1979) at 577. 
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financing. On this view, it could be argued that such dividend is payable 
only if it falls within one of the exceptions to s 76.  
38 In Wu Yang Construction, the court suggested that the inquiry in 
relation to the second issue (whether the assistance rendered was 
“financial” in nature) and the third issue (whether the assistance is for the 
purpose of or in connection with the acquisition), raised in Section III(A) 
above, should be “read and applied holistically – as an integrated whole”.55 
It is respectfully submitted that these are two separate and distinct issues 
and should not be conflated. The example raised here in relation to the 
payment of dividend shows that the conclusion that the assistance that is 
financial in nature may not necessarily lead to a definitive conclusion that 
such assistance is for the purpose of the acquisition of shares. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
39 In this regard, there has been a development in the UK and in the 
Commonwealth countries towards liberalising the legislation governing 
financial assistance. The UK has enacted legislation to abolish the ban on 
financial assistance for private companies, following the 
recommendations of the Company Law Review Steering Group 
(“CLR”).56 Financial assistance rules continue to apply to public 
companies in view of the Second Company Law Directive,57 which has 
been recently amended by Directive 2006/68/EC but which has not yet 
been implemented.58 Australia has retained the ban on financial assistance 
 
 
 
55  Supra, n 10, at [71]. 
56  Sections 677–683 of the Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (“the Companies Act 2006”); the 
Companies Act 2006 was granted Royal Assent on 8 November 2006 and the 
provisions regarding financial assistance are expected to come into force in October 
2008 (see the Written Statement dated 28 February 2007 by the Minister of State and 
Industry and the Regions). For the recommendations of the CLR, see Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 
(DTI, 2000), ch 7; Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report 
URN 01/942 vol 1 (DTI, July 2001) at 218. 
57  The prohibition against financial assistance will remain in place for public 
companies: see ss 678 and 679 of the Compannies Act 2006. The Second Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC provides the basis of the prohibition on rendering financial 
assistance by public companies limited by shares in the UK. 
58  Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 
2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public 
limited liability companies and the maintenance and alternation of the capital, 
[2006] OJ L 264/32. The Directive came into force on 26 September 2006, and it 
provides that Member States may relax the prohibition on public companies giving 
financial assistance to third parties for the acquisition of their own shares, provided 
inter alia that the level of assistance does not exceed distributable reserves and the 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2007) 
 
100 
but has substantially widened the circumstances in which financial 
assistance may be provided, including permitting financial assistance 
where this “does not materially prejudice” the interests of the company or 
its shareholders or the company's ability to pay its creditors.59 New 
Zealand has also liberalised the circumstances in which financial 
assistance may be granted.60 
40 Lew Syn Pau and Wu Yang Construction highlight the fact that the 
debate on the prohibition on financial assistance is far from over. The 
decisions go to some extent in clarifying the scope of the prohibition. 
However, in view of the fact that there is a huge range of practical 
situations in which the possibility of financial assistance can arise and 
there is some uncertainty on the proper rationale underlying the 
prohibition, it is submitted that s 76 should be reviewed beyond the 
matters that were discussed in the CLRFC Report. For a start, the first 
inquiry should be whether the s 76 is still necessary today, bearing in 
mind that the rules on financial assistance could be controlled through 
other means (eg, common law rules on directors’ fiduciary duties). Other 
justifications which are not based on capital maintenance have been 
offered in respect of the ban on financial assistance,61 such as the 
prevention of bidders or target companies from engaging in price 
support schemes for their shares.62 These can be controlled by rules 
relating to market manipulation under the Securities and Futures Act.63  
 
 
 
 
transaction meets certain specific requirements which protect the other shareholders 
and creditors.  
59  Corporations Act 2001 (cth), s 260A. 
60  New Zealand Companies Act 1993, ss 76 to 80. 
61  E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 
372–373. 
62  Eg, the bidder which is offering shares in itself as consideration for the offer for the 
target shares indemnities purchasers of its (the bidder’s) shares. Similarly, the target 
company purchases its own shares in order to influence the outcome of the bid. 
63  Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed, ss 197 and 198. 
